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THE IMPACT OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT’S RISK ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM ON ADVERSE 
SELECTION: FIRST YEAR CASE STUDY 
Steven K. Zimmerman 
July 21, 2016 
In 2014 the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) implemented a 
risk adjustment program to stabilize premiums and neutralize premiums in the individual 
health insurance marketplace. This dissertation will examine the impact of the ACA risk 
adjustment program on adverse selection for one insurer during 2014. This study utilized 
enrollment and claims data for one insurer and employs graphical analysis to test for 
adverse selection. Previous studies have been unable to utilize actual insurer data to test 
for adverse selection in under the ACA risk adjustment program.  
Until the implementation of the ACA, insurers relied on underwriting methods to 
avoid being adversely selected. The ACA has removed the underwriting model by 
requiring insurers to move to a community rated model for pricing plans. This approach, 
along with risk adjustment was intended, by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), to attract insurers to participate in the individual health insurance 
marketplaces. Unfortunately, not all states enjoyed a large contingent of participating 
insurers which consequently had a dramatic financial impact on certain insurers being 
adversely selected.  This dissertation discusses the potential drivers of adverse selection. 
vi 
 
In addition, the study examines potential improvements to help balance the risk pool and 
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Prior to January 1, 2014 individuals (or families) who wished to obtain health 
insurance outside of the workplace were underwritten before they received healthcare 
coverage in the form of a plan from an insurance company. Essentially, the insurer would 
look at a person’s health history, identify any risk factors (i.e., chronic disease such as 
diabetes) and risk behaviors (i.e., tobacco use) and create a premium (monthly payment) 
and cost sharing plan that would help compensate for the financial risk they assumed to 
provide a health plan. Cost sharing is essentially how much the insured person/family 
would have to pay of their own money, should they require healthcare services – these 
costs could include copays and deductibles. In theory, the premium amount and the cost 
sharing amount paid by the individual would cover their medical expenses and 
administrative costs incurred by the insurer for the coming year
1
.  
 One of the arguments against underwriting is that insurers could “cherry pick” 
members. That is to say that insurers could create plans around cost and benefits to attract 
healthier individuals and in turn dissuade those who have the potential to cost more in 
claims payouts than what they are charged in premiums or cost-sharing.  Prior to 
healthcare reform individuals bought health insurance based on need (or perceived need).  
                                                 
1
 The term “individual” refers to the person purchasing health insurance in the individual market (not 
through an employer) for himself or herself and/or their family.  
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If people did not believe they needed health insurance they would not buy it. When this 
happened, only those who needed insurance - usually the sick (e.g., having a chronic or 
known disease or condition) - were the ones buying it and thus driving up the costs. 
When only the sick are buying insurance and contributing to the risk pool, it is referred to 





 Adverse selection has long been a concern for insurance companies when 
designing and pricing health benefits for consumers. Insurers are, many times, at a 
disadvantage when selling products to individuals. Often the individual has information 
about their health which the insurer does not have access to. This is a phenomenon 
described by George Akerlof as information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). For this reason, 
insurers are often adversely selected by those who are most at risk.  A popular example 
demonstrating adverse selection is the restaurant that provides an all-you-can-eat buffet. 
These restaurants may be adversely selected by those who like to eat or know they will 
eat more than the “average” person. Those that know they eat more food or perceive 
themselves as having a larger appetite than the average person may choose the restaurant 
with the buffet over the al-a-carte restaurant which provides less food for the money 
spent.  In the insurance industry, adverse selection is basically accepted as: those who 
purchase insurance have every intention of using it. Underwriting is the tool insurers use 
to help protect themselves against information asymmetry and adverse selection.  In 2014 
insurers had to move to a community-rated model for pricing in the individual market 
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which dictates that premiums for health insurance must be the same for everyone in a 
particular geographic area or community and not determined on an individual basis. 
Moving to a community rated pricing model did not necessarily eliminate adverse 
selection and will be addressed further in Chapter 2.   
 
Affordable Care Act 
 On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law. Changes to healthcare, as a result of the ACA, have 
far reaching implications for the private insurance industry. The ACA’s impact on 
commercial health plans varies depending on the size of the plan. There are different 
policy implications for individual health plans, small group health plans and large group 
health plans. Two of the most notable impacts include formation of health insurance 
exchanges for individuals (or exchanges) and the requirement that all individuals must 
purchase health insurance - also referred to as the individual mandate (Establishing 
Health Insurance Exchanges: An Overview of State of Affairs, 2012). Exchanges act as a 
retail marketplace at the state level for health insurance and were created to: help provide 
consumers with more choices for health benefits and options, provide competition among 
insurers, and drive down prices.  If an individual chooses not to purchase an insurance 
plan they will be assessed an annual tax penalty (HHS, 2013). Prior to the ACA, 
insurance was seen by some as a financial hardship. The new law now includes subsidies 
for low income households to alleviate some of that hardship.  Both the introduction of 
the tax penalty and subsidies are not a direct regulation aimed at health plans or insurers; 
however, it does affect how they choose to conduct business. Insurers must now consider 
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the risk of insuring an unknown (and potentially sicker) population.  Without knowing 
the risk mix of the population there may be resistance by insurers to participate in the 
exchanges.  To assuage those fears, the ACA requires a group of premium stabilization 
programs to be implemented (Health and Human Services, 2012). 
Risk adjustment, the reinsurance program, and risk corridors, commonly referred 
to as the 3Rs, are the stabilization components created within the ACA with the intent to 
diminish the financial risk of health insurers who wish to participate in the exchanges. 
Both the reinsurance program and the risk corridors are temporary and begin in January 
2014 and will last through 2016. Risk adjustment, on the other hand, is a permanent 
program which also begins January 1
st
, 2014 (HHS, 2013).  While risk adjustment is the 
focus of this dissertation, there will be commentary on both the reinsurance program and 
risk corridors throughout the various sections of this dissertation to understand their 
impacts.  
 Health Insurance Exchanges 
 
 A health insurance exchange (exchange or marketplace) is a retail-like structure at 
the state level created to provide competition in the health insurance marketplace.  The 
exchanges will offer more choices for consumers with regards to health plans and 
options.  Exchanges must meet minimum federal guidelines around options and pricing 
as well as provide information for each product on the exchange to help guide the 
consumer in choosing the best plan and benefits available for their needs and financial 
situation (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).  The exchanges started 
operating in January 2014 and provided a marketplace for individuals and small 
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businesses of 50 or less full time employees (FTE)
2
. Exchanges will be run at the state 
level (or possibly at regional levels through interstate partnerships) and may be designed 
and run by the state, a state and federal partnership, or a state may defer administration of 
the exchange (almost wholly) to the federal government, in which case the federally 
developed exchange model will be implemented in those states (see Table 1) (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2016). 
 
Table 1. State Health Insurance Market Place Types (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2016) 
Type of Market Place 
Count of 
States 
Federally-facilitated Marketplaces 27 
State-Partnership Marketplaces 7 
State-based Marketplaces 13 
Federally-supported Marketplaces 4 
 
Federally-facilitated marketplaces are run and maintained by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). Individuals purchasing insurance through this 
exchange, do so through the healthcare.gov website. In state-partnership marketplaces, 
individuals will purchase insurance through healthcare.gov but the states provide some 
additional functions such as in-person assistance. The state-based exchanges are the sole 
responsibility of the state. The states run and administer the exchange and all associated 
functions.  Individuals, who purchase their insurance from a state-based exchange, 
purchase it through the state run exchange website.  Federally-supported marketplaces are 
                                                 
2
 Beginning in 2016 the small business definition will include 2-100 full time equivalent (FTE) employees. 
Full time equivalents include part-time employee hours who count towards Full-Time Equivalent 
calculation.   
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run and administered by the state but leverage healthcare.gov as their enrollment 
interface.  
Regardless of the type of exchange marketplace, the purpose of the exchange is to 
facilitate changes to the insurance market which will drive consumer engagement as well 
as provide plans to the medically uninsured, including individuals with little or no means 
of purchasing medical insurance otherwise.  ACA-compliant plans are any plans that 
began healthcare coverage on January 1
st
, 2014 or later and are not considered 
grandfathered or transitional plans (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). 
 
Underwriting 
 Prior to the implementation of the exchanges and stabilization programs, insurers 
would determine the premium  for the insurance policy and the associated benefits based 
on the particular individual’s (and/or family members who would be included on the 
policy) health history. This is also known as risk rating.  Gathering this information helps 
the insurer evaluate the potential financial risk of the individual and allows them to set 
the premium to help cover expected medical costs. Underwriting was utilized by insurers 
to protect themselves against adverse selection. With the passage of the ACA, 
underwriting is no longer allowed in the individual markets and insurers have had to 
move to a community rating model for pricing their benefits.  
 
Community Rating 
Community rating requires insurers to charge the same premium to all people in a 
particular geographic region. No longer can insurers consider current health or prior 
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health status of an individual when charging premiums for their products
3
.  The concept 
of community rating sounds advantageous for those who were previously charged much 
higher premiums based on their health risks. Conversely, those who are healthier or 
younger and with fewer health issues might see an increase in their premiums.  
Premium Stabilization Components 
Reinsurance Program 
The Reinsurance program, one of two temporary programs, was designed to 
stabilize premiums by partially offsetting claims for high cost members in the non-
grandfathered individual market. All health insurers and self-insured plans must make 
contributions – meaning they must pay into the reinsurance pool. Any contributions 
collected for a particular state will only be used towards reinsurance payments in that 
state (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). The HHS operated payment 
process is designed to ensure payments do not exceed available funds from collected 
contributions. Only non-grandfathered individual plans (referred to as individual ACA 
plans) are eligible for payments. Reinsurance is maintained at the state level and the state 
may run the program or defer to HHS (HHS, 2013).  CMS will reimburse insurers for 
every member whose claims costs for a calendar year exceed $45,000.  This is sometimes 
referred to as the attachment point.  The maximum claims costs (or cap) per member is 
$250,000.  Thus, the maximum eligible reinsurance reimbursement amount per member 
is $205,000 ($250,000 - $45,000). 
Risk Corridors 
 Risk corridors were created as a direct incentive for carriers to participate in the 
                                                 
3
 Insurers can adjust premium based on age and gender as well a tobacco use. 
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exchanges by providing protection to health plans for the first few years as they figure 
out how to price their products for a new and unknown risk pool. Risk corridors look at 
percentages and not dollar amounts. If a plan’s allowable costs are less than 97 percent of 
its target amount, it pays HHS a percentage of the difference. If a plan’s allowable costs 
are more than 103 percent of its targeted amount, HHS pays the insurer a percentage of 
the difference (HHS, 2013).  If the plan’s allowable costs are between 92%-97% then the 
insurer must pay HHS 50% of their gain.  If the plan’s allowable costs are between 
103%-108%, HHS will share in 50% of the costs. For those plans below 92% and above 
108%, HHS’ respective allocation drops to 20%.  The formula looks something like the 
following (La Couture & Booth, 2015):  
Allowable Costs = Medical Claims Costs + Quality Improvement Costs 
Target Costs= Premiums – Administrative Costs 




 To demonstrate we can fill in the values and calculate a hypothetical Risk Corridor 
Payment: 
Allowable Costs = $9,500,000 + 200,000 
Target Costs= $11,000,000 – 1,000,000 
Risk Corridor Ratio = 97% 
The above example would not result in any payment to or from HHS because the ratio is 
97%.  The next example demonstrates payment from HHS: 
Allowable Costs = $9,500,000 + 1,000,000 
Target Costs= $11,000,000 – 1,000,000 
Risk Corridor Ratio = 105% 
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We find the 103% of the target amount of $10,000,000 which is $10,300,000.  HHS pays 




 Risk adjustment (RA), the only permanent premium stabilizing program, transfers 
payment between insurers at the state level based on each insurer’s risk pool4. This 
program is intended to reduce or eliminate premium differences between plans based 
solely on expectations of favorable or unfavorable risk selection or choices in the 
individual and small group market, purchased on the exchange (on-exchange) or outside 
of the exchange (off-exchange).  RA scores each issuer’s member based on demographic 
data, geographic data, and claims information (ICD-9s are mapped to conditions and each 
condition gets a co-factor
5
).  There are some calculations to adjust for benefit differences 
and for allowable rating factors relative to state averages. Finally, carriers with low 
adjusted scores will pay into a state transfer fund and carriers with high adjusted scores 
will receive money from the fund. This is simply just an allocation of funds from the 
insurers with healthier populations to the insurers with less healthy populations. Risk 
adjustment was designed to eliminate adverse selection and the need for underwriting as 
well as encourage insurers to participate in the exchanges without out fear of great 
financial risk. The RA program can be operated by the state or the state may defer to the 
federal government (HHS) to run the program on their behalf (HHS, 2013). The 
federally-facilitated RA program is the most common implementation with most states 
                                                 
4
 Payment transfer is calculated independently for small group and for individual markets. 
5
 ICD-9-CM (International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition, Clinical Modification) is a standard set 
of codes used by physicians and hospitals to represent diagnosis for patients (CDC). 
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opting for this approach. As RA is the focus of this paper risk scoring (calculation of a 
risk score), payment transfer, and other details of this program will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
Risk Adjustment History 
RA, as a concept or practice, is not necessarily new in the United States. Medicare 
has been running a Medicare Risk Adjustment (MRA) program for over 10 years 
(Kautter, Pope, & Keenan, Affordable Care Act Risk Adjustment: Overview, Context, 
and Challenges, 2014).  
         Table 2. Medicare Risk Adjustment vs ACA Risk Adjustment 
Medicare Risk Adjustment ACA Risk Adjustment 
The carrier is paid a premium for 
each member based on that 
member’s risk score. 
Carrier either pays in or receives a 
payment based (heavily) on its overall 
risk score (weighted average of all 
members’ risk scores). 
The risk reimbursement comes 
from CMS. 
The risk reimbursement is executed 
between insurers via a payment 
transfer formula. 
Prospective determination - Prior 
year data used for determination  
 
i.e., 2014 Risk scores use data 
collected  
between 7/1/2012 – 6/30/13  
Concurrent determination – current 
year data used for determination 
  
i.e., 2014 Risk scores use data 
collected 
 between 1/01/14 – 12/31/2014 
 
However, the Medicare model is quite different in key aspects. MRA utilizes 
demographic, geographic and claims data to generate a risk score at the individual level 
similar to the ACA version of the program. However, in MRA the insurer is reimbursed 
by CMS based on the health status of the individual.  In CRA the premium income and 
11 
 
the claims costs result in a balanced scale after payment transfers between insurers in 
each state. Refer to Table 2 for a summary of differences in methodology (Geyer, 2013).   
 
Existing Risk Adjustment Programs 
Globally, other countries began utilizing risk adjustment methods as early as the 
1970’s.  Several countries have well established programs including the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, and Israel. Table 3 outlines the US version of RA compared with other 
established programs around the world (Susan Mateja, 2012).   
 
Table 3. Global Risk Adjustment Programs 
 
 
UK Israel Netherlands Chile South Africa United States 
Health Financing 
System 





Non - Profit  
Sick Funds 
For - Profit  
Sick Funds 





Non - Profit 
Medical Schemes 
Private 
# of Insurers 152 4 ~20 13 ~100 7586 
Implemented 
Started in 1976 
PCTs in 2006 
Sick Funds 
1950’s 
Risk Fund in 
1995 
Started in 1990 
Mandatory in 
2006 
Started in 1990 
Fund in 2005 
Schemes in 1967 




Models Budgets Prospective 
Prospective / 
Retrospective 
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Affordable Care Act Risk Score Components and Calculation 
Risk adjustment is not necessarily a complex concept but implementation is not 
easy. This section will provide examples of scoring an individual and how that score is 
then used to factor into the payment between insurers.  In the simplest terms, an 
individual receives a score based on their gender, age, geographic location, and health 
status at the end of the calendar year. For this dissertation and all examples the calendar 
year is 2014.   Getting to that member’s score is a little more complicated. 
To achieve an individuals’ a risk score, diagnoses are mapped to condition 
categories (CCs) which are then moved into a Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) 
and if needed moved into an HCC Group – see Figure 1. If an enrollee has multiple, 
unrelated diagnoses (such as prostate cancer and arthritis), both HCC values are used in 
calculating the individual risk score. Additionally, if an adult enrollee has certain 
combinations of illnesses (such as a severe illness and an opportunistic infection), a 
Severity Factor is added to the person’s individual risk score. Finally the individual is 
assigned a Risk Factor that represents the relative expenditures a plan is likely to incur 
for an enrollee with a given category of medical diagnosis.
 
In addition, if the enrollee is 
receiving subsidies to reduce their cost-sharing, they receive a cost-share adjustment to 

















The first step in calculating a risk score is to determine the enrollee’s 
demographic cofactor. For example, using a female of age 36 in a silver tier plan an 
individual would be assigned the CMS supplied cofactor of .490 (see Table 4).  The next 
step is to convert the individual’s diagnosis codes into CCs. Looking at the example 
claim, in Figure 2, this member has 4 diagnoses. The diagnostic codes, based on a CMS 
supplied table,  show that diagnosis code 25000 maps to CC 21(Diabetes), diagnosis code 
042  maps to CC 1 (HIV), 24900 maps to CC 21 (Diabetes)  and 29000 does not map to 
any CC. Next the CCs go through the hierarchy process and are assigned to a 





HCC HCC Group 
Severity 
Factor 
Final Risk Score 
 
Figure 1. Risk score calculation process 
Cost Share Adjustment 




process. CMS assigns the weights for the HCC at a metal level (Health and Human 
Services, 2013).   
Table 4. Age-Sex-Metal Cofactors (Health and Human Services, 2013) 
 
Figure 2. Sample Claim 
Member ID 987654321  Claim Number 12345 
Primary Diagnosis Diagnosis 2 Diagnosis 3 Diagnosis 4 
25000 042 29000 24900 
 
In our example CC 21 is converted to G01 and assigned a cofactor of 1.120. CC 1 
is converted to a HCC 001 with a cofactor of 4.74. An individual can only be assigned a 
CC once in a given plan year regardless of how many times they are diagnosed with the 
same condition. In the above example there were two diagnoses that resulted in the same 
HCC.  Our individual only gets the corresponding cofactor applied once.  
 
 













Adult MAGE_LAST_21_24 Yes 0.258 0.208 0.141 0.078 0.062
Adult MAGE_LAST_25_29 Yes 0.278 0.223 0.150 0.081 0.064
Adult MAGE_LAST_30_34 Yes 0.338 0.274 0.187 0.101 0.079
Adult MAGE_LAST_35_39 Yes 0.413 0.339 0.240 0.140 0.113
Adult MAGE_LAST_40_44 Yes 0.487 0.404 0.293 0.176 0.145
Adult MAGE_LAST_45_49 Yes 0.581 0.487 0.365 0.231 0.195
Adult MAGE_LAST_50_54 Yes 0.737 0.626 0.484 0.316 0.269
Adult MAGE_LAST_55_59 Yes 0.863 0.736 0.580 0.393 0.339
Adult MAGE_LAST_60_GT Yes 1.028 0.880 0.704 0.487 0.424
Adult FAGE_LAST_21_24 Yes 0.433 0.350 0.221 0.101 0.072
Adult FAGE_LAST_25_29 Yes 0.548 0.448 0.301 0.156 0.120
Adult FAGE_LAST_30_34 Yes 0.656 0.546 0.396 0.243 0.203
Adult FAGE_LAST_35_39 Yes 0.760 0.641 0.490 0.334 0.293
Adult FAGE_LAST_40_44 Yes 0.839 0.713 0.554 0.384 0.338
Adult FAGE_LAST_45_49 Yes 0.878 0.747 0.583 0.402 0.352
Adult FAGE_LAST_50_54 Yes 1.013 0.869 0.695 0.486 0.427
Adult FAGE_LAST_55_59 Yes 1.054 0.905 0.726 0.507 0.443
Adult FAGE_LAST_60_GT Yes 1.156 0.990 0.798 0.559 0.489
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All scores are additive so our final calculation would look like: 




.490 + 1.120 + 4.74 = 6.35 
Risk Adjustment Payment Transfer 
Insurance premiums are priced to cover the expected costs of an insurer. 
However, most of the time actual costs do not equal expected costs.  The difference 
between the two is often attributed to information asymmetry and an individual’s 
aversion to risk. The risk adjustment transfer payment compensates insurers in those 
situations where premiums do not cover the actual costs.   
Once individual risk scores are calculated for all enrollees in the plan, these 
values are averaged across the plan to arrive at the plan’s average risk score. The average 
risk score, which is a weighted average of all enrollees’ individual risk scores, represents 
the plan’s predicted expenses (based on the demographics of enrollees). Under the HHS 
methodology, adjustments are made for a variety of factors, including actuarial value 
(i.e., the extent of patient cost-sharing in the plan), allowable rating variation, and 
geographic cost variation. Under risk adjustment, plans with a relatively low average risk 
score will make payments into the system, while plans with relatively high average risk 
scores will receive payments.   The aggregated risk scores at the plan level are referred to 
as the Plan Liability Risk Score and is one of several inputs into the payment transfer 
formula (Pope, et al., 2014).  The formula is written as (variables listed in Table 5.): 
                                                 
7
 There are severity groups and interaction cofactors that are also considered in the calculation under certain 




𝑷𝑳𝑹𝑺𝒕 ∗  𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗  𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕
∑ (𝒔𝒕𝒕 ∗ 𝑷𝑳𝑹𝑺𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗  𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕)
−  
𝑨𝑽𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝑹𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕
∑ (𝒔𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝑽𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝑹𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕𝒕
] 𝑷𝒔̅̅ ̅ 
If we look at the formula, notice there are two parts:  
left-hand side: 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝑺𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕∗ 𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕
∑ (𝒔𝒕𝒕 ∗𝑷𝑳𝑹𝑺𝒕∗𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕∗ 𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕)
  right-hand side:  
𝑨𝑽𝒕∗𝑨𝑹𝑭𝒕∗𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕∗𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕
∑ (𝒔𝒕∗𝑨𝑽𝒕∗𝑨𝑹𝑭𝒕∗𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕∗𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕𝒕
 .  
The left-hand side of the formula, sometimes referred to as required revenue, 
represents premium including the plan liability risk score (PLRS) and the right-hand side, 
sometimes referred to as allowable revenue, represents premium without any risk variable 
(Pope, et al., 2014). The difference of the two signifies the transfer amount paid by the 
issuer into the risk pool fund if that amount is negative, meaning they incurred less risk 
compared with state average.  If the difference is positive then this signifies the insurer 
amount is a receivable because more risk was incurred than the state average.  
Table 5. Payment Transfer Variables 
Variable Name Variable 
Plan t 
Plan t’s Transfer Amount 𝑇𝑡 
State Average Premium 𝑃?̅? 
Plan Liability Risk Score 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑡  
Plan Allowable Rating Factor 𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑡 
Plan Induced Demand Factor 𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑡 
Area Geographic Cost Factor 𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑡 
Plan Metal Actuarial Value 𝐴𝑉𝑡 




Evaluating the left-hand side numerator of the equation, in addition to the PLRS – 
which not only represents the health of the plan but the Actuarial Value (AV) of the plan, 
there are also the Induced Demand Factor (IDF) and the Geographic Cost Factor (GCF) 
variables to consider. When healthcare is priced in a way that might encourage greater 
utilization of services (low premiums or minimal cost sharing for the enrollee) this 
creates induced demand. The IDF factor helps compensate for that demand at the 
different metal levels (Health and Human Services, 2013). Table 6 lists the IDF values 
for each metal level.  
    Table 6. Induced Demand Adjustment for Each Metal Level 







There are some costs associated with a plan that are inherent due to their geographic 
location that an insurance company cannot avoid. In order to prevent insurers from 
abandoning these particular locations the GCF creates an adjustment to help compensate 
for those related costs (Health and Human Services, 2013).  Rating areas are created by 
the states and a GCF is created for each of those areas and is based on the state average 
premium of the silver plans within the state. The GCF state average value is 1.0 and any 
difference will represent the percent of cost difference compared to the state average. For 
example a GCF with a value of .95 would signify that the geographic area’s costs are 5% 
less than the state average.  Likewise a GCF of 1.05 indicates that the geographic area’s 
costs are 5 % higher than the state average costs.  Absence of the geographic cost factor 
18 
 
could adversely affect payment in geographic areas with low cost for plans with low risk 
as well as plans with high risk in high cost areas. In Figure 3, plan B has a low risk score 
of .61 and the GCF has been set to 1.0 for both plans indicating that the state has a 
uniform geographic rating or no rating. However, in Figure 4, note that if  Plan A is in a 
50% more costly geographic area then that will reflect in Plan B’s payment to Plan A.  
 
    Figure 3. Transfer example without GCF 












A Gold 1.39 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 0.5 278.00 213.33 64.67 $200.00 
Plan 
B Silver 0.61 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 0.5 122.00 186.67 -64.67 
  
 
     Figure 4. Transfer Example with GCF Impact 












A Gold 1.39 1.00 1 1.00 1.50 0.5 309.46 252.63 56.83 $200.00 
Plan 
B Silver 0.61 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 0.5 90.54 147.37 -56.83 
  
 
The right hand side numerator of the equation (which does not include the risk 
variable) includes the AV factor, the ARF, IDF and GCF.  The IDF and GCF are the 
same for both sides of the formula. Actuarial value measures the relative generosity of 
benefits covered by a health insurance plan. Under the ACA, a health insurance plan’s 
actuarial value indicates the average share of medical spending that is paid by the plan, as 
opposed to being paid out of pocket by the consumer. The calculation takes into account 
a plan’s various cost-sharing features, such as deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, and 
out-of-pocket limits. Aside from cost-sharing features, however, the calculation does not 
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reflect other plan features that may be important for consumers who are choosing plans.  
The actuarial value is mapped to what CMS calls “metal” levels or tiers shown Table 7.  
Table 7. Metal Level Actuarial Value 







Insurers, based on Table 7, will pay approximately 70% of all medical expenses 
for any individual in a silver level plan and the individual would be responsible for about 
the other 30% of their medical costs during the plan period. (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services)
8
.  AV is necessary to guarantee each insurer is paying their fair share 
into the transfer funds pool. Low risk plans with a low AV would actually pay more 
money into the transfer pool if AV was not factored into the formula. In this situation 
claims expenses are considered but not adjusted to compensate for their relative value 
(Pope, et al., 2014).  Conversely, plans with high risk scores and higher AV would 
receive less money from the transfer process. Below is an example showing the impact of 
AV on the transfer payment.  The actuarial value of a plan has direct impact on the 
PLRS.  Table 8 below shows the plan liability risk score without any AV adjustment 
                                                 
8
 The 70% actuarial value in practice refers to the total value of out-of-pocket costs across all enrollees in 
particular plan - not for each individual in a plan. However for the purposes of this paper we apply the AV 
to the individual.     
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given by the predicted liability divided by the state average. Only using the predicted 
liability, Plan A has an understated risk score and Plan B has an overstated risk score. 
Table 9 shows the plan’s liability risk score with the AV adjustment. 
Table 8. Risk Score with Unadjusted Actuarial Value (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2012) 
 Plan A  Plan B  State Average  
Actuarial value  .6 (Bronze) .8 (Gold) .7  
Predicted total 
Expenditures 
$1,000  $1,000  $1,000  











Table 9. Risk Score with Unadjusted Actuarial Value (Centers for Medicare and   
Medicaid Services, 2012) 
 
The allowable rating factor is only used to adjust for age.  As required by the ACA, 
states had to develop age ranges (sometimes referred to as age bands) and corresponding 
age factors to be used by insurers. States had the option to default to the federal rating 
bands (shown in Table 10) if they chose not to develop their own (Pope, et al., 2014).  
 Plan A  Plan B  Average/Total  
Actuarial value  .6  .8  .7  
Predicted total 
expenditures  
$1,000  $1,000  $1,000  
Predicted liability  $600  $800  $700  
Unadjusted liability 










Adjusted risk score  1.0  
(.86 – .86+1)  
1.0  
(1.14 – 1.14 +1)  
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These age-relating factors help fill the gap due to any age incongruities between plans 
and associated costs based on age
9
.  The ACA requires that the age rating ratio be no 
more than 3:1, however states may modify the ratio as long as it conforms to the 
requirement. For example a 2.5:1 ratio may be used. This allowable rating factor permits 
an insurer to charge a premium more consistent with covering costs for someone of a 
particular age. Based on the federal rating factors in Table 10, a 46 year old individual 
would receive an ARF of 1.5 and would be allowed to be charged a premium 50% greater 
than a 22 year old with a ARF of 1.0 (1.5:1 Ratio).   







21 1.000 36 1.230 51 1.865 
22 1.000 37 1.238 52 1.952 
23 1.000 38 1.246 53 2.040 
24 1.000 39 1.262 54 2.135 
25 1.004 40 1.278 55 2.230 
26 1.024 41 1.302 56 2.333 
27 1.048 42 1.325 57 2.437 
28 1.087 43 1.357 58 2.548 
29 1.119 44 1.397 59 2.603 
30 1.135 45 1.444 60 2.714 
31 1.159 46 1.500 61 2.810 
32 1.183 47 1.563 62 2.873 
33 1.198 48 1.635 63 2.952 
34 1.214 49 1.706                  64+ 3.000 
35 1.222 50 1.786                    —                  — 
 
While the numerator represents an individual plan’s revenue (required and allowed), 
the denominators present the state averages for required revenue and allowable revenue
10
. 
Finally the factors are multiplied by the state average premium. 
                                                 
9
 The ARF is only applied to adults age 21 or over. Infants age 0 to 1 have a set value and Children ages 2-
20 have a set value 
10
 The denominator as well as the premium uses weighted averages as denoted by “s” in the formula. 
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Using example data provided by Pope et al in Figure 5, one can step through the payment 
transfer formula.   
 
   
Each plan will have access to the values that are inputs to the numerators on both 
halves of the equation.  What is unknown, are all the inputs to the denominator.  As of 
2015, CMS did not publish state average risk scores or premiums, so calculating the 
payment transfer was, at best, difficult for an individual insurer to perform. In our 
example, the state average premium represents the value calculated by CMS.  We first 
start with Plan A’s left had side of the equation: 
𝑷𝑳𝑹𝑺𝒕 ∗  𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗  𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕





Solving the left hand side we get 1.39 which must then be multiplied by the state average 
premium of $383.33 to give us $523.83
11
.  This tells us that based on the health risk of 
Plan A’s enrollees, that this is Plan A’s required revenue needed to compensate for 
                                                 
11
 Depending on rounding precision, this example may result in minor differences in calculated values 
when trying to reproduce this example. 
    Figure 5.  Transfer Payment Example Variables 
Plan 
Metal 
















A Gold 1.39 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 532.83 408.89 123.94 $383.33 
Plan B Silver 0.61 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 233.83 357.77 -123.94 
 





providing cost of care to their population.  Next we determine Plan A’s allowable 
revenue by calculating the right hand side of the transfer formula: 
 
𝑨𝑽𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝑹𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑰𝑫𝑭𝒕 ∗ 𝑮𝑪𝑭𝒕




           (.5*.8*1*1*1) + (.5*.7*1*1*)  
 
Solving the right side for Plan A we get 1.066 which we must multiply by the 
state average premium of $383.33 to get $408.89.  To determine the transfer amount we 
subtract the right side form the left side to get $123.94.  A positive amount indicates the 
amount to be received through a transfer payment. Knowing that Plan A is receiving 
money and that ACA Risk Adjustment is a zero-sum program, we should see, after 
calculating Plan B’s transfer, that Plan B should have to pay $123.94.  We can check this 




This translates into .61 and multiplied by the state average premium of $383.33 to give 
Plan B the required revenue of $233.83.  The next step is to calculate the right side: 
                    .7*1*1*1 
(.5*.8*1*1*1) + (.5*.7*1*1*)  
 





The result is .933 and is multiplied by the state average premium to give allowable 
revenue of $357.77. After subtracting the allowable revenue from $233.83, Plan B’s 
calculated difference is $-123.94
12
. The negative difference indicates a payment into the 
transfer pool to be distributed among the carriers in the state with less healthy 
populations, which in this example is only Plan A.   
 
Risk Adjustment’s Role in Public Health 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) health data from 2012, the United States spends nearly 18% of its GDP on 
health care (OECD, 2014). The OECD average GDP for all countries is under 10%. The 
country with closest health care expenditures as a percent of GDP is the Netherlands at 
12%.  The United States cannot continue to keep growing its current increasing rate of 
health care expenditures. Health care costs are exorbitant in almost all facets from 
hospital care, insurance, dental services, and nursing homes.  Risk Adjustment’s intended 
goal is to lower costs and to help make insurance affordable for everyone regardless of 
socioeconomic status.  Affordable insurance creates more opportunity for access to care 
and preventive services in turn lowering costs in the long run.   Previous risk adjustment 
models have not taken into consideration socioeconomic status or other public health 
related variables such as behavior and environment.  The current ACA RA model does 
consider income and provides subsidies for low-income families.  The current model is 
based on community rating (premiums based on a population not an individual) and is 
usually limited to a large geographic area – the county level or larger (HHS, 2013). There 
                                                 
12
 This is a simple example where market share is even across two plans. As more insurers participate and 
market share is distributed across numerous insurers and rating areas you can expect the transfer amounts 
received and paid by each insurer to change accordingly. 
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are, many times, large health disparities within a given county especially between urban 
and suburban areas. It can be argued that the current ACA risk adjustment model should 
be revised to rate members at a more granular level such as the neighborhood similar to 
UK’s model for Risk Adjustment (Susan Mateja, 2012) 
 
The Unknown 
In order for Risk Adjustment to be effective, healthy people must participate in 
the exchanges to help offset the costs of the less healthy. The ACA attempts to 
accomplish this task through the “individual mandate”.  The ACA required all persons to 
purchase insurance or pay a tax penalty. In theory, this penalty would entice people to 
purchase insurance who may normally opt out (usually these are younger, healthier 
people). This increases the amount of premiums paid into the risk pool which would help 
cover the costs of providing services to the less healthy people in the risk population. 
Prior to the ACA there were approximately 40 million uninsured Americans.  In 
2014, the first year of the exchanges and the individual mandate, approximately 7 million 
Americans enrolled in ACA insurance plans through the exchanges.  However, of those 7 
million enrollees, it was reported that only 26% of those were previously uninsured 
(Roy). In addition, The Kaiser Family Foundation reports that 83% of enrollees qualified 
for premium subsidies (Levitt, Claxton, & Damico, 2014).  Since the new enrollees are 
unknown, there is uncertainty about the financial impact they will have on insurers 
(claims costs) and the government (subsidies). An influx of primarily unhealthy enrollees 
could cause more destabilization of the market and premiums.    
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Over and above the concern with new and unknown enrollees, insurers have new 
regulations by which they must adhere. They must renew any policy as long as the 
premium is paid in full. Health plans may not refuse renewal because of illness which 
occurs after the initial policy is issued. Some numbers indicate that as many as 10,000 
people a year were dropped from their current plan due to illness or injury prior to the 
ACA (Editorial Board, 2013). In addition insurers may not drop or water down 
(eliminate) the benefits of the plan for those who become sick. Insurers may not increase 
premiums by ten percent without providing justification of the increase to state or federal 
officials. In 2010, 75 percent of the rate increases were for ten percent or higher. The 
same report indicated that in 2012, after the policy was implemented, that number fell to 
34 percent; which resulted in an average premium increase of 30 percent less than in 
2010.  
The mandate was designed to increase the demand for health insurance products 
and foster competition. Unfortunately, the penalties are not severe enough to overcome 
the hurdle to purchasing a plan that is often more expensive than the penalty itself 
(Keckley, Coughlin, Korenda, & Rice, 2011). The Congressional Budget Office(CBO) 
estimates four million people will choose to pay the penalty -  most of whom will be 
young, healthy Americans who estimate they can afford to go without insurance 
(Moeller, 2012).  In addition, there are no enforcement provisions for the penalties and no 
criminal actions or liens can be imposed on those who do not pay.   
Statement of the Problem  
The premium stabilization rule is a new program under healthcare reform and 
there is much uncertainty about the program’s ability to reduce costs for individuals, 
insurers, and the government.  Although there has been much discussion around premium 
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stabilization, and risk adjustment in particular, impacts and outcomes of the program 
have only been simulated and modeled recently (Zhu, Layton, Sinaiko, & McGuire, 
2013).  The 3R’s were implemented in calendar year 2014 and insurers did not know how 
they fared until June 30
th
 of 2015 when CMS provided each carrier a payment transfer 
notice. Until now there has been little or no empirical evidence or historical context from 
which to assess a commercial federal risk adjustment program in the United States.  A 
case study of the first year of the program will provide quantifiable impacts not 
previously realized through simulations or modeling.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
 The goal of this study is to determine if a public health policy, specifically ACA 




This study is unique because the Premium Stabilization rule is a new program 
with little history within the United States. This will be one of the first such case studies 
to examine the ACA program and measure the effectiveness of eliminating adverse 
selection and creating premium and cost equilibrium within a subpopulation in the United 
States. 
Research Question 
Did the ACA Risk Adjustment program effectively eliminate adverse selection 




The ACA risk adjustment will neutralize adverse selection.  
Alternative Hypothesis 
 Adverse selection will continue to exist despite the intervention of risk 
adjustment.  
Summary 
Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), also referred to 
as healthcare reform, was signed into effect in March of 2010 many of the components 
that directly attempt to lower the costs of insurance for individuals did not take effect 
until January 1, 2014.  One crucial piece of reform legislation prohibits insurers from 
rejecting enrollees based on prior or current health status or from charging “sick” 
enrollees higher premiums (this means no more underwriting). The risk population now 
is referred to as community rated which means that insurance policies offered within a 
given geographical area must be offered at the at the same price to all individuals 
regardless of prior or current health status. Thus the community must have a large, yet 
diverse (healthy and sick) risk pool so that costs are spread across all members. In order 
for this to work there needs to be a mechanism in place to preclude insurers from not 
participating in the individual exchange market space. That mechanism is the premium 
stabilization programs created through the ACA.  
The premium stabilization rule, through the payment transfer process, eliminates 
underwriting and adverse selection. Risk adjustment will fill the gap when an issuer 
assumes more financial risk of its enrollees than is covered by premium payments and 
other cost-sharing methods. This program is intended to reduce or eliminate premium 
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differences between plans based solely on expectations of favorable or adverse risk 
selection or choices in the individual market, in and out of the exchange.  The RA 
methodology, at high level, scores each issuer’s member based on demographic data, 
geographic data, and diagnosis codes from claims and those scores are then aggregated at 
the state level. Finally, carriers with lower adjusted scores will pay money into an RA 
pool in each state and carriers with higher adjusted scores will receive money from that 
pool. This equates to a transfer of funds from the insurers with healthier populations 
(lower risk scores) to insurers with less healthy or populations (higher risk scores). This 
zero-sum strategy was developed to entice insurers to participate in providing healthcare 
insurance without fear of losing money due to high claims costs.  This dissertation will 








 Asymmetric information is a concept familiar in economics and has been proven 
to lead to adverse selection in many markets where goods or services are bought and sold.  
(Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1986). The health insurance market is not exception and there has 
been much written on the topic of adverse selection in the health insurance markets.  
Ronald Andersen outlines a behavioral model for health services which identifies the 
sources that influence an individual’s perceived health needs which may lead to 
asymmetric information between the individual and the insurer (Andersen, 1995). His 
original model creates three categories that drive the information asymmetry: 
Predisposing characteristics, enabling resources, and need for care.  
Predisposing characteristics include the individual’s demographic information, 
social structure and health beliefs. Demographic information might include age, gender 
and health history.  Social structure includes family, education, occupation, and physical 
environment.  Health beliefs include diet and exercise. Enabling resources stem from 
family and community. Need for care is the individual’s perceived need for a service or 
treatment.   
To eliminate or reduce adverse selection would require a method to neutralize 
information asymmetry. The question until now is how best to solve for adverse selection 
in the health insurance. The most common discussion around solving for adverse 
selection in healthcare is risk adjustment, though there appear to be different thoughts on 
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the optimal approach or model (Glazer & McGuire, Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets 
with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care, 2000).  
Although risk adjustment does seem to be the preferred solution there are notable 
problems that may exist with this approach. Michael Geruso and Timothy Layton 
introduce a model that identifies the effect of inaccurate medical record coding.  They 
developed this model to identify medical record coding anomalies which could be the 
result of insurers incentivizing physicians and other health care providers to “upcode” 
diagnoses (Geruso & Layton). Upcoding is a term used to describe a method in which 
physicians indicate a more severe version of a diagnosis in the medical record or possibly 
even falsely add diagnoses to the record. Since insurers are reimbursed (through the risk 
score process) by diagnosis codes they could potentially improve their transfer payment 
amount through the upcoding process. For ACA risk adjustment, improving the payment 
transfer could include either lowering the amount you pay out or increasing the amount 
you receive.  
 Another concern for the risk adjusted approach is favorable selection (Newhouse, 
Price, Willaims, Hsu, & McGuire, 2015).  Tiag Sawhney refers to this as indirect 
selection and it occurs when insurers attempt to influence the consumers to choose a plan 
or benefit that will minimize the financial risk for the insurer (Sawhney, 2012). This 
could be accomplished through health benefit design by raising the premiums or lowering 
the number or types of services covered that may not appeal to those who require 
considerable medical treatment.  One note of interest regarding selection may be that 
insurers believe sicker enrollees equate to more money in the way of risk adjustment 
transfer payments. This situation may cause unintended consequences based on the 
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approach to selection given that insurers must still pay claims for these high-risk 
enrollees. Risk adjustment’s aim is to alleviate favorable selection by insurers’ but both 
Sawhney and Newhouse, et al. offer reasons why risk adjustment may fall short in that 
regard.  One theory is that there may be attainable “sweet spot” for some insurers; 
meaning they have those enrollees that are diagnosed with high risk factors but either do 
not utilize all the services available to them to address the diagnoses or,  more likely, 
certain enrollees with high risk factors find alternative forms of care or care for 
themselves. One example would be someone who is diagnosed as a diabetic but performs 
the necessary actions, such as following a prescribed diet and exercise routine and 
thereby avoids unneeded physician and hospital visits.   
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
This dissertation will focus on three theoretical perspectives: Utility theory, game 
theory, information asymmetry.  Utility theory is based on the premise that people will 
choose the option most preferable to them based on the value or worth of the good or 
service (Fishburn, 1968).  Utility theory In the case of Risk Adjustment posits that certain 
individuals may opt to pay the tax penalty rather than purchase insurance as the penalty is 
perceived as a considerably less financial hardship.    
 The transfer payment and the resulting zero-sum gain for insurers falls under 
game theory as introduced by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Von 
Nuemann & Morgenstern, 1953).  More expressly, we can say that any player’s loss or 
gain is exactly balanced by the loss or gain of another player or players in the game. We 
can use poker as an example. If 10 people are invited to play poker and the buy-in (or the 
33 
 
amount required to sit at the table and participate) is $100 then the total amount of money 
will sum to $1000.  Consider a winner take-all poker match. In this case the winner gains 
$900 and all other players would have lost $100 each for a total of -$900 between all of 
them. The same would hold true for a timed game where each player leaves after one 
hour with the money in their pot.   Assuming again, that each player started with $100 we 
can show the results of the game after one hour in Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Zero-Sum Game Theory Example - Poker 
  Buy-in Amount Won/Lost Take Home Amount 
Player 1 $100  $150  $250  
Player 2 $100  ($25) $75  
Player 3 $100  $150  $250  
Player 4 $100  ($75) $25  
Player 5 $100  $75  $175  
Player 6 $100  ($100) $0  
Player 7 $100  ($100) $0  
Player 8 $100  ($100) $0  
Player 9 $100  ($100) $0  
Player 10 $100  $125  $225  
Sum $1,000  $0  $1,000  
 
 Prior to the ACA, the model for purchasing insurance is closely related to 
Akerlof’s concept that there is competition among suppliers of goods or service based on 
price but not necessarily based on the features or the quality of the goods or services 
(Akerlof, 1970). To demonstrate his concept, Akerlof uses the example of selling used 
cars. Someone purchasing a car cannot know whether the car is a good car or a bad car.  
Akerlof refers to these bad cars as “lemons”. He posits that “lemons” and good cars can 
be bought or sold for the same price because information asymmetry. The seller of the 
“lemons” holds information about the car that the buyer does not have. For example the 
windshield wipers may not work when it is raining. If the seller knows this information 
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but the buyer does not then this results in information asymmetry.  This information 
asymmetry, in the health insurance industry, often led to adverse selection prior to the 
ACA. Often times, those who knew they required medical services were the ones who 
purchased insurance.  
In the Pre-ACA days, insurance companies may have been competing to supply 
various services and plans were underwritten or based on what the insurance company 
knew about their enrollees. This approach tried to eliminate some of the information 
asymmetry and services and costs were more tailored to the expected needs of the 
individual. Today however, Akerlof’s concept, with regard to health insurance, may be 
even more valid because the ACA requires all insurers to provide 10 essential health 
benefits (EHB), as listed in Table 11 and insurers now must focus more on competing 
based on price but also  allows for larger gaps of information asymmetry (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013). 
For example, a person with diabetes may understand that they will require several 
physician and hospital visits and may choose the insurance policy that has a platinum 
level actuarial value versus a policy with a bronze level. In this scenario the fact that the 
consumer has diabetes may be unknown to the insurer.  Another example may be the 
person who has decided that since they must now purchase an insurance plan (as a result 
of the mandate) they will now maximize their utility based on their, now required, 
investment. This means an individual may feel obligated to utilize or obtain services 
simply because she is paying for them rather than having a need for them.   
 
Table 11. 10 Essential Health Benefits 
1. Outpatient care—the kind you get without being admitted to a hospital 
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2. Trips to the emergency room 
3. Treatment in the hospital for inpatient care 
4. Care before and after your baby is born 
5. Mental health and substance use disorder services 
6. Prescription drugs 
7. Services and devices to help you recover if you are injured, or have a disability 
or chronic condition. This includes physical and occupational therapy, speech-
language pathology, psychiatric rehabilitation, and more. 
8. Your lab tests 
9. Preventive services including counseling, screenings, and vaccines to keep you 
healthy and care for managing a chronic disease
13
. 
10. Pediatric services: This includes dental care and vision care for kids 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 To examine adverse selection this study will utilize the graphical framework 
established by Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein (Einav & Finkelstein, 2011).  This 
framework provides the ability to empirically test for adverse selection under different 
scenarios. Specifically for this dissertation, the Einav and Finkelstein model for “positive 
correlation” will be used and will be referred to as the EF model.  This test will compare 
one insurer’s costs (paid claims) and premium across a given state.  A similar graphical 
framework will be constructed for risk adjustment to determine the ACA risk 
adjustment’s ability to effectively stabilize premiums during the first year of the program.   
Einav and Finkelstein refer to the representation in Figure 7 as the textbook 
model. The textbook example illustrates an insurance market based on price where 
consumers have the option to purchase insurance or not purchase insurance and all 
maintain the same aversion to risk. Price and cost are represented by the vertical axis and 
the horizontal axis represents the quantity of individuals who purchased insurance, also 
referred to as demand. The Demand Curve is represented by line BE where B is the most 
                                                 
13
 Preventive Services exist for three categories: all adults, women and children. 
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expensive plan and E is the least expensive plan. This line indicates an individual’s 
willingness to pay for a plan.  The marginal cost (MC) is indicated by the MC curve 
represented by line AF. Marginal costs in most markets, outside of health insurance, are 
usually attributed to the cost of producing one extra unit of a product or service. In 
creating widgets we know the cost of creating x number of widgets.  We can then 
determine the cost of creating x+1 number of widgets. However, in the health insurance 
market, marginal cost is difficult to measure. Following the utility theory, it reasons that 
those that have the highest expected utility (or costs) are those willing to pay the most for 
insurance (those closer to point B on the demand curve) which is demonstrated in this 
version of the EF model. The model shows that the demand/cost relationship that creates 
adverse selection can be graphically represented by a downward slopping MC curve seen 
in Figure 7. The AC curve (line AG) denotes the average cost, Peqm   (line Peqm J) 
represents equilibrium price, Qeqm (line Qeqm C) is the quantity equilibrium and Qmax is 
maximum number of insured individuals.  Point C is the competitive equilibrium price 
and quantity. The area between points DCEF is referred to as deadweight loss which 
indicates that supply and demand are not in equilibrium. This dissertation will focus on 
the MC curve. In Einav and Finkelstein’s model test for positive correlation for selection 
shown in Figure 8, they build upon the first graphical framework by considering two 
populations and their average costs: insured (ACinsured) and uninsured (ACuninsured).  They 





Figure 7. Textbook Adverse Selection Example 
 




 The graphical models in this study will simplify the EF model. The study will 
focus mostly on the MC Curve and will remove any consideration given to equilibrium, 
efficiency and welfare loss. The analysis will follow closely to Figure 9 below. 
 
Figure 9. Graphical Framework Sample 
 
 
The EF model, Positive Correlation Test for Selection, attempts to show the 
theoretical impact of adverse selection on welfare loss. Others, such as Glazer, McGuire 
and Shi modified the model to analyze various aspects of premium and cost relationships 
to equilibrium. The Glazer et al model used Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data and 
which was a true empirical test. However, it did not test for adverse selection utilizing 
ACA Risk Adjustment enrollees or data.  This dissertation will focus solely on applying 


























The study is a retrospective case study utilizing quantitative data for one insurer 
who participated in 5 states, providing ACA-complaint insurance to approximately 
500,000 individuals.  The study will examine the insurer’s state and metal aggregated 
enrollee premiums, claims costs and relative health compared with the rest of the state’s 
total insured risk pool population to determine: 1) if adverse selection existed and 2) if 
the payment transfer formula results in amelioration of any adverse selection
14
.   The 
study will use descriptive and graphical analysis based on the framework of Liran Einav 
and Amy Finkelstein.  
Population 
 The population of this study includes five states and will examine each state 
independently.  The five states chosen represent the insurer’s top five states based on 
population of individual membership and consisted of members who purchased health 
insurance and were enrolled in a plan for any period of time during the 2014 calendar 
year. The population for this study was also limited those members who purchased a 
metal-level plan (Platinum, Gold, Silver, Bronze) and did not include those who 
purchased a catastrophic plan. In addition, individuals must have had made at least one 
                                                 
14
 Relative health is measured by the ACA Risk Adjustment risk scoring methodology  
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premium payment.  Since premiums are charged to a subscriber (person purchasing the 
insurance), all costs directly associated with a subscriber and/or their dependent(s) were 
aggregated at the subscriber level. The definition of subscriber is provided to help 
provide context around the process for allocating premium and claims costs. However, 
for this study, the term enrollee will be utilized instead of subscriber. We limited the 
study to states where the evaluated insurer had at least 10,000 enrollees through the 
course of the 2014 year
15
.  Monthly premiums were aggregated into a yearly total 
premium for each enrollee based on the number months the he or she was enrolled in a 
plan (billable enrollee months) – see Figure 10 for an example.    
 






















Doe 1111 B N $0 0 $0 $200 
Joe Doe 1111 C N $0 0 $0 $50 
 
Description of Study Variables 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables for this study are: insurer’s aggregated claims costs 
and insurer’s state average premium which represents demand.  The insurer’s claims 
costs acts as the de facto representation of the overall health status of the insurer’s 
population for the given state.  Finally, premiums reflect the insurer’s revenue and are the 
                                                 
15
 This number was chosen so that the binning of members in the next chapter is at least 2000 enrollees per 
bin at the state level – 2000 enrollees is a commonly accepted actuarial credibility standard for cost 
estimates (American Academy of Actuaries' Life Valuation Subcommitte, 2008).   
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actual premium rates charged or billed for insurance. That is to say that the premium 
amount is the enrollee’s share of premium plus, if applicable, any financial assistance 
provided through an APTC.  Based on past studies that indicate premium drives purchase 
decisions, this dissertation will use the premium to create the independent variable 
demand and the resulting demand curve (Buchmueller, 2006). The premium is also used 
as an input in the payment transfer formula described in Chapter 1.  
 
Dependent variable  
In the graphical framework utilized in this study, the marginal cost curve 
represents a dependent variable of interest with a downward sloping curve indicating 
adverse selection as explained in Chapter 2. The payment transfer amount (either paid or 
received) is the other dependent variable under observation and will indicate if the final 
results of risk adjustment in 2014 accurately compensated insurers based on the health of 
their population when compared with premium.  
 
Data Analysis 
 For the purposes of plotting the data utilizing the EF Model, data bins were 
created. Each state bin consisted of at least 2000 enrollees and the number of bins per 
state was dependent on the insurer’s total enrollee population of the state.  The total 
premium and costs for each bin were aggregated and divided by the number of enrollees 
per bin to give an average premium per enrollee per bin and an average cost per enrollee 
per bin. Figure 11 shows an example of the binning product. 
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The data was aggregated in relational database tables in a Microsoft SQL server 
and then imported and graphed in Microsoft Excel.  The linear regression (R
2
) of each 
line was calculated using Excel to study the fit and slope of each of the data curves. Each 
state was graphed prior to applying the payment transfer amount and then again after 
applying the payment transfer. The payment transfer amount was distributed across the 
data bins to achieve an adjusted cost per member and the adjusted average cost was 
applied to the graph to demonstrate the financial adjustment to that curve.  
 
































































































































































10 6613 54299 3457840.75 31338767.16 522.89 4738.96 577.15 4293.38 6589.28 
9 6613 54233 3617899.66 34681758.34 547.09 5244.48 639.50 4486.66 6794.87 
8 6613 54695 3783336.26 34850760.65 572.11 5270.04 637.18 4731.79 6988.66 
7 6613 53646 3993661.15 36870723.49 603.91 5575.49 687.30 4899.05 7234.18 
6 6613 54685 4317954.41 36982739.86 652.95 5592.43 676.29 5399.45 7510.63 
5 6613 54980 4717672.70 46979961.69 713.39 7104.18 854.49 5931.10 7894.27 
4 6613 53291 5232189.10 43023425.21 791.20 6505.89 807.33 6375.88 8091.79 
3 6613 54444 5953611.77 48816759.14 900.29 7381.94 896.64 7411.97 8620.43 
2 6613 56443 6843417.84 54402907.89 1034.84 8226.66 963.86 8832.55 9239.67 
1 6613 56854 8466588.51 67800988.44 1280.29 10252.68 1192.55 11007.09 10252.68 
 
The bin numbers are created and ordered based on premium so that bin number 1 
contains the highest average enrollee premium. These are the individuals that are willing 
to spend the most money for insurance. Bin 10 contains the lowest average enrollee 




The University of Louisville Institutional Review Board (IRB) evaluated and 
granted approval for this study after an expedited review. A copy of the approval letter is 
included in Appendix A.  
 
Summary 
 This study examines the membership and cost relationship of one insurer 
participating in the first year of the ACA Risk Adjustment program.  The study 
encompasses 5 states and approximately 500,000 individuals whose claims costs were 
evaluated at the state level as well as the metal tier level within each state (Platinum, 
Gold, Silver, and Bronze).  The population included all subscribers in an ACA compliant, 
individual plan for the evaluated states.  The case study utilized graphical analysis and 
descriptive statistics to measure adverse selection based on claims costs prior to the CMS 
payment transfer and then again after the transfer of funds. The model used in this paper 
was based on the established framework of Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein and the 
results from the study are offered in Chapter 4. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 This is a case study utilizing data from one insurer (with the exception of the 
CMS published state data) and may or may not be generalizable to other health plans. An 
initial year study is likely to look different from insurer to insurer.  It is also likely that a 
study will result in different outcomes conducted in subsequent years of the RA program 
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as health plans learn more about the potential population and gain a better understanding 
of how to price and design benefits for these populations.   
 
Conclusion 
In the pre-reform era of healthcare, individuals self-reported medical history to 
health insurance carriers who in turn used this information to underwrite an insurance 
policy for that particular individual. This allowed the policy to be written in such a way 
that the insured burdened some of the risk. Someone with more self-reported illness 
would pay a higher deductible or possibly be denied for a plan altogether. This 
arrangement sometimes led to adverse selection where only the sick were buying 
insurance.  The ACA’s Premium Stabilization rule looks to address both of these issues 








This chapter will provide the results of the study utilizing graphical and 
descriptive analysis. The initial results tested, graphically, for adverse selection of a given 
state and where possible, between metal tiers.  A subsequent graphical analysis applies 
the payment transfer funds to the graph in the form of an adjusted cost curve for 
comparison. An R-squared regression is used to determine fit for all curves on the graph.  
See Table 12 for the list of states for this study.  
      Table 12. Evaluated States 




Risk Score  
Florida (FL) 174,506 1.639 1.408 
Georgia (GA) 198,387 1.594 1.614 
Michigan (MI) 28,197 1.813 1.312 
Mississippi (MS) 32,239 1.621 1.696 
Texas (TX) 88,022 1.682 1.494 
 
In Table 12, enrollee count represents the number of subscribers; the State 
Average Risk Score is the CMS calculated risk score indicating the relative health of the 
entire individual market population for the state. Insurer Average Risk score represents 
the relative health of the examined insurer’s population within the state. Where the 
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insurer Average Risk Score is lower than the State Average Risk Score the Insurer paid 
into the transfer pool of funds. Also, the cost curve moves to the right. Conversely, where 
the Insurer risk score is lower than the state average, the insurer receives transfer funds 
and in this case, the cost curve moves to the left.   
Below are the results for each of the previously listed states. Each state created a 
bin of enrollees.  The bins are sorted by premium (or demand). Each bin aggregates the 
premium (price of the plan) and claims and calculates the average Premium per member, 
average costs across all enrollees, and average claims costs per member per bin.  The 
number of enrollees per bin is provided in each state section.  
 
Florida 
 The first state of interest is Florida and, shown in Figure 12, illustrates the 
premium per member (Prem/Mbr), this could also be noted as Demand, and the average 
cost (AC) of the population distributed across all bins. The cost per member (for each 
bin) is the Marginal Cost (MC) and will be the focus of most graphs (recall that a 
downward sloping MC curve indicates adverse selection).  See Table 13 for enrollee 
Florida population per bin. As is with all states in this study, the Silver metal tier had the 
highest number of enrollees, and in Florida, the Bronze tier had the second highest 
number of enrollees, followed by Gold and then Platinum.  The second Florida graph, 
Figure 13, will show the Premium and Cost for the Platinum tier and Figure 14 will 
express the same information for the Bronze tier. The Gold and Platinum tiers account for 
about only 12% of the Insurer’s Florida population and neither were large enough to 
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graph separately.  Finally, Figure 15 includes both the Silver and Bronze metal tiers and 
the relationship of the MC curve between the two populations. 
 Relying on the EF textbook model for adverse selection, Figure 12 indicates that 
the Insurer was adversely selected in the state of Florida.  The same holds true for the 
Bronze and Silver Metal tiers.  In Figure 14 the purpose is to determine if one metal tier 
(one with more coverage) was adversely selected over another metal tier (one with lese 
coverage) for the insurer.  The Silver plan is the higher priced plan but also covers more 
of the costs than the Bronze plan. This analysis is equivalent to the EF Positive 
Correlation Test for Selection described in the Chapter 2 and shown in Figure 8.   
 
                  Table 13. Florida Bin Population Counts 
State Metal Tier 
Number of 
Enrollees per Bin 
FL All 6980 
FL Platinum 787 
FL Gold 917 
FL Silver 6951 































































































































 Figure 15 demonstrates that the Silver plan has a downward sloping MC and was 
adversely selected over the Bronze Plan.  The next step after determining adverse 
selection was to apply the adjusted cost per member (marginal cost minus the payment 
transfer amount) to the graph and observe the impact of that cost (adjusted marginal cost) 
in relationship to the premium.  First we graph the State Average Premium.  The CMS 
reported Risk Score for the state of Florida is 1.639 and the CMS calculated risk score for 
the insurer was 1.408. The state average risk score was 16% higher than the insurer’s risk 
score indicating the insurer had a relatively healthier population than the state as whole. 
The insurer had to pay transfer funds to the state of Florida in the amount of $77,885,835 
which translates into 446.32 per member
16. This amount is added to the insurer’s member 
cost and is noted as the adjusted cost in the graph.  This took the average cost per 
member for 2014 from $3,285 to $3,823.  This adjusted amount is 16% higher than prior 
to the transfer payment.  Figure 16 plots the Adjusted AC next to the pre-transfer AC to 
show how the adjusted cost aligns with the premium (or demand).  Notice as the insurer 
pays out in transfer funds, the adjusted AC curve moves further away from the premium. 
In Figure 17 the adjustment is applied to the MC to give an adjusted MC. The actual 
value of the slope of the curve in Figure 17 is not as relevant as to whether the slope is 
downward sloping (negative value) or upward sloping (positive value).  In all cases for 
the state of Florida the slopes are negative, indicating adverse selection.  
 
 
                                                 
16
 The payment transfer amount indicated does not reflect catastrophic members.  This CMS published 
payment report includes catastrophic members and will show a slight variance when compared with the 























































 Michigan follows the same downward slope for the MC curve as shown in Figure 
































Mississippi follows the same downward slope for the MC curve as noticed in 



































In the state of Texas, the insurer had a lower state average risk score which 
resulted in a payment in to the transfer find pool. What’s interesting to note in Figure 20 
is that the cost per member was greater than the premium even before adjusting for the 
transfer payment. This indicates that the insurer had high claims costs and did not receive 
a payment transfer but rather paid into the transfer pool. Most of this is caused by the 
Platinum and Silver plans having lower premiums than incurred costs as seen in Figures 
21 and 22 respectively. Finally, in Figure 23, the Texas Bronze population demonstrates 
what the EF model refers to as complete unraveling. This happens when the AC curve is 
always above the premium (or demand curve) and the MC curve is always below the 
premium. According to Einav and Finkelstein an event known as the death spiral can lead 
to this situation.  The death spiral is caused when insurers try to increase their costs based 
on the average cost (AC) of the prior coverage period. As this cycle continues from one 
period to the next, the insurer eventually prices themselves out the market. In this 
particular case the insurer could choose not to sell a Bronze plan but remain in the market 
selling other plans.  The enrollee counts per bin for Texas are in Table 14 below. 
 
Table 14. Enrollee Count per Bin for Texas 
State Metal Tier 
Number of 
Enrollees per Bin 
TX All 3521 
TX Platinum 1239 
TX Gold 855 
TX Silver 2791 





















































































































































 The state of Georgia is unique in that the studied insurer provided coverage to 
approximately 70% of the enrolled Georgia individual population. The first graph,  
Figure 24, illustrates the insurer’s total Georgia population premium and cost.  Reviewing 
the risk score in Table 12, it can be inferred that the insurer had a relatively sicker 
population and thus would expect a payment to offset the costs of providing for that 
population.  The insurer did receive a payment but that payment resulted in $11.02 per 
member which moved the cost line to the left but, as noticed in Figure 125 did not 
compensate entirely for the incurred costs. Consequently, the adjusted costs remain 
greater than the premium. Even with the distribution of the transfer payment, the slope of 
the marginal cost curve is still unchanged. This will be the case in all instances.  The 
payment transfer will not change the direction of the slope (from positive to negative) but 




















































CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter begins with a more thorough analysis of the state of Georgia. 
Secondly, an examination of the potential drivers of adverse selection will be discussed. 
Also, 2014 risk adjustment conclusions provided by other analyses will be reviewed and 
discussed in comparison to the findings in this dissertation. Next, the strengths and 




 Given the market share of the Insurer in Georgia (which is one of the inputs to the 
payment transfer formula); a bootstrap analysis (resampling with replacement) was 
conducted to determine if there was any opportunity for the insurer to avoid being 
adversely selected.  Bootstrapping is used to validate the original data’s variances 
especially in extreme cases. More specifically, bootstrapping provides a more normalized 
set of central tendencies around averages for aggregated data such as claims costs and 
premium which might be skewed after binning. Additionally, resampling the observed 
data provides the “least prejudiced estimate possible (Shalizi, 2010).”   
The bootstrapping analysis used in this study generated 10,000 samples of the 
insurer’s total Georgia population and then again for each metal tier.  Each sample 
included the same number of individuals as the observed population. Each sample 
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calculated the slope of the marginal cost curve to determine if a slope greater than or 
equal to zero could be realized. A downward sloping curve is negative and indicates 
adverse selection.  Table 15 contains the observed slopes compared to the bootstrapped 
slopes. 
Figures 26 – 30 display the histograms for the insurer’s entire population of the 
state of Georgia and for each of the metal tier populations in the state.  
To ensure an effective comparison between the observed and sampled data, a calculation 
was used to generate 10,000 random rows of the observed data utilizing the mean and 
standard deviation.  The bootstrapping method reduced the sampling errors found in the 
observed data. This is evident in the narrower dispersion of slopes as indicated in the 
histograms.  
The bootstrapping method does have some limitations. It does not accurately 
estimate minimum or maximum values of distribution. The accuracy of the results that 
occurs with bootstrapping is dependent on the number samples taken. As the number of 
samples increases the sampling errors generated by bootstrapping decreases. For this 
reason the study used a bootstrapping count of 10,000. After validating the results with 
bootstrapping, the predicted costs were plotted against the observed costs to identify the 
outliers. The standard error (SE) of the bootstrapped results was applied the predicted 
MC Slopes in each histogram. Figures 31 – 36 illustrate the predicted marginal costs of 
the Georgia population with SE bars. Any observed point outside the reach of the SE bar 
is considered an outlier. Figure 31 shows the actual versus the predicted values for the 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 26.  Georgia MC Slopes Bootstrapped vs Observed 
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Figure 28. Georgia Gold MC Slopes Bootstrapped vs Observed 
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Figure 30. Georgia Bronze MC Slopes Bootstrapped vs Observed 
 
  
Figure 32 illustrates the financial impact of the claims costs outliers.  The first 
population bin (the far left of the graph) shows that incorrectly predicting the costs 
(outside the standard error) resulted in a $17 million difference.  The second population 
bin resulted in $2 million of unexpected costs. The payment transfer amount received 


































































































































































































































 To overcome adverse selection, insurers want to strive for a constant marginal 
cost. Since costs are estimated for a community, insurers expect an average cost for that 
community.  The constant marginal cost can be represented by a flat MC curve see in 
Figure 37.  This flat MC curve would indicate that individuals are purchasing health 
insurance plans more consistent with their true health costs.  
 
Figure 37. Constant MC Curve 
 
 
Drivers of Adverse Selection 
As stated in previous chapters, the prevailing catalyst of adverse selection is 
information asymmetry.  However, it is possible that there are those individual that do not 
fully understand their risk behavior or their expected health costs and may not purchase 
the plan that coincides with those risks. If a person who constantly refuses to go to the 


















surgery, that person has overvalued their health risks and undervalued their health costs 
and thus purchases the wrong plan (possibly purchases a bronze plan instead of a silver 
plan or silver instead of gold). This dissertation labels this circumstance as uninformed 
asymmetry since the individual is truly uninformed about their health risks or health 
needs. Essentially, uninformed asymmetry is an individual’s inability to accurately 
estimate their expected health costs.  
While individuals ultimately purchase insurance based on their perceived needs, 
other factors contribute to insurers being adversely selected. One of the possible drivers 
of adverse selection realized in the study, at least for some states, is the number of 
insurers that participated, or sold insurance (especially on the exchanges) within each 
state.  According to healthinsurance.org, the state of Mississippi had only two insurers 
participating on the state exchanges (Norris, Mississippi Health Insurance Marketplace, 
2016). To compound matters, the participating insurers, initially, combined to only 
participate in about 44% of the state’s counties. Eventually, one of the participating 
insurers offered plans state wide. However, 95% of the counties in Mississippi had only 
one insurer participating in anyone location, leaving many residents without a choice. It 
would stand to reason that if you are the only insurance option available then that insurer 
would expect to be adversely selected by default. In addition, The Kaiser Family 
Foundation reports that only about one-third of those eligible to purchase insurance on 
the exchanges in Mississippi actually purchased insurance on the exchange.  This places 
Mississippi in the bottom-third of states based on eligible individuals participating in the 
exchanges. This would lend itself to the conclusion that those who perceived a need for 
insurance are the ones who actually purchased insurance (The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
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Foundation, 2015).  Two-thirds of those that purchased a plan on the Mississippi 
exchange belonged to the studied insurer. This is one possible reason for the 
demonstrated adverse selection in Mississippi.  
Georgia also suffered a similar pitfall as Mississippi as only one insurer offered 
plans that provided coverage in all counties within the state thus limiting the options of 
the potential enrollees (Norris, Georgia Health Insurance Exchange/Marketplace, 2016).  
Another similarity to Mississippi was that only about 30% of eligible exchange enrollees 
actually purchased insurance through the exchange.   
The state of Texas had twelve insurers selling plans in 2014 and the state had over 
700,000 enrollees on the exchanges alone.  The number of enrollees on the exchange in 
Texas was second only to Florida for those states operating a federally-facilitated 
marketplace (Norris, Texas Health Insurance Exchange/Marketplace, 2016).  Even with a 
large number of enrollees, and numerous options for those enrollees, the insurer 
researched for this study still experienced adverse selection 
In those places where there were multiple insurers, the advantage could go to the 
insurers with the larger shares of the market. This is due to the fact that larger insurers 
should theoretically align closer to the market average premium. The insurers with small 
market shares, comparatively, are likely to enroll either the above-average risk population 
or the below-average risk population.  The American Academy of Actuaries stresses this 
point in a published report in April 2016 (American Academy of Actuaries, 2016).  Table 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Small insurers are also impacted when large insurers are adversely selected.  This 
means that those small insurers had many of the low-risk, low-cost individuals and the 
amount some had to pay out in transfer funds could be considered overwhelming 
(Goldstein, 2016). This situation might dissuade small insurers from participating in 
providing ACA coverage. The RA program is already being blamed for driving some of 
the small insurers out of the market (Teichert, 2016).  The fear that comes with less 
insurers participating is that of less competition, resulting in higher pricing of products. 
Notice that the largest unpredictability in Table 16 belongs to the insurers with 
small market share.  Those small insurers with healthy members may not have received 
enough premium revenue to cover their portion of the transfer payment. Conversely, 
those insurers with the larger market shares that were adversely selected may not receive 
enough funds through the transfer payment mechanism to cover their claims costs. This 
situation arises because the transfer formula calculates a percentage of premiums. This 
can be illustrated through an example as shown in Table 17. Plan A has 70% of the 
market share (0.7 in the Market share column) and a less healthy population (indicated by 
a PLRS of 1.2).  All else being equal, Plan B must pay out 26% of their premium per 
member to Plan A.  However Plan A only receives 11% of their premium per member. 
This model relies on the PLRS to accurately reflect the incurred costs of the insurer. This 
is similar to the occurrence in Georgia for the studied insurer as they only received about 




Table 17. Payment Transfer as a Percent of Market Share 
 
 
The potential number of insurers and the number of eligible enrollees should 
provide plenty of options so that the phenomenon of adverse selection does not exist.  
However, other options exists that move enrollees away from ACA RA plans. 
Specifically, this scenario exists because insurers can continue to offer “grandfathered” 
and “grandmothered” plans. A grandfathered plan is a plan that was available prior to 
March 23, 2010. These plans are not ACA-compliant but can exist indefinitely as long as 
the benefits and costs don’t change. Grandmothered plans went into effect after March 
23, 2010 but prior to January 1, 2014. These plans expire in 2017. Both of these plans 
would continue to remain an option for individuals if those plans were cheaper or offered 
a different set of benefits than those offered through an ACA plan that took effect 
January 1, 2014 or later.  The healthy (or less risk adverse) may find these plans suit them 
better.  By choosing one of these paternal plans an individual has removed herself from 
the risk pool for risk adjustment.  
 An unknown population and the use of market scan data to calibrate the 2014 RA 
model contribute to the inability to price accurately and create the potential to drive 
adverse selection.  Given that many people, prior to 2014, chose not to purchase 
insurance, it was difficult to determine the health risk of those individuals and simulate 
their impact on the health insurance market with regards to demand in the form of 
premiums and impact to claims costs.  HHS decided the 2010 Truven MarketScan data 













Plan A Silver 1.2 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 0.7 111.11 100.00 11.11 $100.00 0.11
Plan B Silver 0.8 1.00 1 1.00 1.00 0.3 74.07 100.00 -25.93 -0.26
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would be a suitable dataset for calibrating the RA model. Unfortunately, the MarketScan 
population does not accurately reflect all diagnoses when compared with ACA 
enrollment.  A published MarketScan White Paper lists the following limitations 
(Adamson, Chang, & Leigh, 2008): 
 The MarketScan data is based on a large convenience sample (not random). This 
can lead prejudices in the data and may not estimate other populations accurately.  
 The data is comprised mostly from large employer claims 
In addition one year of claims experience (2010) creates the opportunity to incorrectly 
estimate the true value of a condition. The cost of chronic conditions could be more 
accurately reflected utilizing multiple years of data for calibration. Acute conditions can 
be more unpredictable from one year to the next and may tend to overestimate costs from 
one year to the next. 
Finally, the condition of moral hazard is not a driver of adverse selection. However, 
as Einav and Finkelstein point out, it could drive a similar correlation between cost and 
demand resulting in the same downward slopping MC as adverse selection (Einav & 
Finkelstein, 2011).  Although it is different, moral hazard can be addressed through some 
of the same mechanisms that will address adverse selection. 
 
Review of Other 2014 RA Conclusions 
Much of the discussion to date about the 2014 RA program is divided in terms of 
the program’s success (or lack of success). There is a lot of discussion about how the 
inputs into the model need to be revised.  Supporters agree, that 2014 was successful but 
also that the program has room for improvement.  Critics have had a strong voice and 
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some even stating the program is having a “reverse Robin Hood effect (Goldstein, 
2016).”  However, the number of discussions around empirical data still remains limited. 
Oliver Wyman Consulting published a report in 2016 where they indicated that 
the ACA RA program “contributed positively toward the intended objective of allowing 
issuers to compete on bases other than risk selection (Giesa, 2016).” The report relies on 
series of graphs to demonstrate the “positive” contributions of ACA RA. The first graph 
correlates the ACA temporary Reinsurance payments
17
 to insurers with the risk-
adjustment payment transfers for those insurers. This data is published by CMS in their 
yearly Payment notice
18
. Recall that the ACA Reinsurance (RI) program reimburses 
insurers for claims costs at the enrollee level for claims costs between $45,000 and 
$250,000.  By definition these members are high cost members and one could infer 
(without too large of leap) that insurers receiving a large RI payment had a high risk 
population and would likely to receive a transfer payment through RA. The Wyman 
report acknowledges that this is not a surprise.  The graph, as presented by Oliver 
Wyman, is illustrated in Figure 38. 
Unfortunately, Figure 38 alone, (nor the narrative provided around the graphical 
analysis) does not provide details around, or infer, the positive contributions of RA.  
Given that RA is a zero-sum game, it would be surprising if this graph produced results 
much differently than what is currently being displayed. In this instance it would be 
helpful to see the RI payments per member per month (PMPM) plotted against Premium 
PMPM to see if these high cost members paid a high premium. This would allow the EF 
                                                 
17
 PMPM in the graph refers to per member per month 
18
 The payment notices for RI and RA are published in the same report and are published on June 30
th
 for 
the previous calendar year.  
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test for adverse selection to be applied.  This particular graph does not necessarily 
validate that RA is working as intended. 
 




In the second graph provided by Oliver Wyman, RA payments are plotted by insurer 
size based on ACA member months. The Wyman report contends that there was not a 
“systematic bias based on member months” and attempts to illustrate this in Figure 39.  
Again, it appears that the requisite premium is needed to validate this analysis.  In 
addition claims costs should also be included to provide a complete picture of the 
insurer’s total costs for the member (claims costs + risk adjustment receipts). The third 
                                                 
19
 Oliver Wyman uses the term Risk Adjustment Receipts to refer to the RA transfer payment 
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Wyman graph, seen in Figure 40, displays transfer payments relative to the statewide 
average claims. Figure 40 provides some insight into the effectiveness of the payment 
transfer formula. Unfortunately, the figure does not provide the correlation of the claims 
costs to the risk scores.  Claims cost is a good data element to evaluate when reviewing 
the RA model. However, a more telling graphical story might be the correlation between 
risk scores and claims costs. Given that risk scores (and not claims costs) are inputs to the 
payment transfer, this correlation could contribute to validating the risk scoring 
methodology. Without this analysis, Figure 40 falls short in validating the contributions 
of the ACA RA program.  At the most simplistic level, the formula to determine 
effectiveness of RA should be: [Premium – (Costs - Transfer Payment)]. This would be 
needed to wholly understand the true impact of insurer size on the model. Recall the State 
of Georgia from the previous chapter.  There is clearly a case to be made for insurer size 
in the RA model when given a state with few options. The simple formula above does not 
validate if an insurer was adversely selected.  The formula does provide insight into how 




        Figure 39. Risk Adjustment Receipts by Issuer Member Months 
 
   The Oliver Wyman report does provide some useful information at a glance 
when reviewing the impact of ACA RA in 2014. There are some improvements to be 
made on their analysis though.  Given that adverse selection is relies heavily on pricing 
and available options, premium must be included where possible. It can be assumed there 
exists a strong correlation between claims costs and risk scores but those should also be 
included to strengthen the state-wide claims analysis. An insurer with a low number of 
member months translates into small insurer population or market share.  
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Figure 40. Risk Adjustment Receipts vs Distance from State-Wide Average Claims 
 
  
 Other issues have been raised regarding the introductory version of the ACA RA 
program including the scoring of HCCs, the impact of market average premiums, high 
cost and low cost plans when calculating the transfer formula, and the timing of final risk 
adjustment determination (CHOICES, 2015).  
 The Risk Adjustment Payment Transfer Report provided by CMS was delivered 
on June 30
th
 2015. Until this report was available, insurers did not have visibility into the 
state markets outside of their enrollees. The payment transfer report provides market 
averages which, during 2014, were not made available by CMS. The ability to see the 
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state average risk scores allows insurers to understand how they compare with the rest of 
the state. This is important for pricing plans for the next year as well as booking financial 
accruals for the current year of the program. This particular issue is a recurring topic 
throughout ACA RA discussions (Perlman & Liner, 2016). Given that pricing for the 
next year is required to be submitted to the states prior to June, insurers were unable to 
price their plans based on their current relative market-share and risk.  Unfortunately the 
2014 payment transfer data was not useful for 2016 either because many enrollees 
switched plans within the same insurer or even switched insurers from 2014 to 2015 
creating a risk pool mix that, in some cases, was considerably different than that of 2014. 
The inability to accurately price plans creates an opportunity for an insurer to be 
adversely selected. Many of the discussions referenced throughout this chapter are, 
admittedly, at the distinct disadvantage of only having the ability to use data that has been 
made available publicly and are unable to validate or audit that data. This dissertation has 
the distinct advantage of utilizing actual insurer data, albeit for only one insurer. 
However, the ability to utilize insurer data provides a uniquely quantitative study not 
readily available elsewhere.   
 
The Case for a Concurrent Model 
 The current risk adjustment methodology is based on a concurrent scoring 
model. This simply means that the individuals are scored during the current calendar year 
they pay premiums and incur claims.  The advantage to the concurrent model is that risk 
scores more accurately reflect the health status of the individual during the year 
coinciding with the payment transfer. Additionally, CMS adds that the concurrent model 
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more accurately accounts for acute costs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2016). Seth Chandler, in an article published by Forbes, argues that this approach does 
little to incentivize an insurer to control costs (Chandler, 2016). Instead, he posits, the 
insurer can pass the costs along to the other insurers via a payment transfer.   
The ACA model is different than the Medicare prospective model. The 
prospective model utilizes previous year’s claims data to predict an individual’s risk for 
the current year. The Medicare Risk Adjustment program includes only those members 
who have purchased a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan through a private insurer. 
However, these individuals are still Medicare enrollees and CMS can easily track 
individuals as they move from one plan or insurer to another. Individuals purchasing an 
ACA plan are enrollees of that insurer, not the government and no personal data 
(including diagnoses or conditions) is passed on to CMS for risk scoring purposes
20
. This 
is an important distinction in the two models. Given this difference, enrollees would be 
impossible to track as they move across the ACA insurer landscape. For this reason 
alone, implementing a prospective model would impossible.   
 
Impact on Insurers 
CMS, in their 2016 White Paper, says, “Each insurer’s premiums should reflect 
anticipated risk adjustment transfers and therefore in effect the risk of the entire market 
risk pool, not just the risk of its enrollees.”  This is a great theory but by making this 
statement, CMS is indicating that insurers should have complete knowledge of the market 
risk pool.  Insurers may have this capability after participating several years in the ACA 
                                                 
20
 Insurers are required to submit enrollees with a unique identifier that is unique to the insurer. No 
personally identifiable information is submitted to CMS for risk adjustment purposes.  
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RA program but new insurers wishing to enter the market would be at a disadvantage 
having not been exposed to the market population. The same is true for small insurers if 
we are to consider that the smaller insurers attract the high-risk or low risk populations 
disproportionately to the market average. It might be more difficult for those smaller 
insurers to understand the true risk of the market in order to price accordingly.  Even in a 
concurrent model, there should be a mechanism to allow for Hierarchical Condition 
Categories (HCC), at the very least, to move with the enrollee.  In order for risk 
adjustment to avoid adverse selection, individuals need to understand their true health 
risks. It would be beneficial if the states had some health knowledge of those purchasing 
insurance. This would allow individuals to be guided to the appropriate metal plans so 
that they are absorbing the costs associated with health risks. Individuals cannot 
efficiently sort themselves into the correct plans as evidenced by the results of this study. 
There should be some effort in the form of public policy to help guide individuals into the 
correct type of plans. In addition, insurers need to receive more timely information about 
the market risk pool (not just their risk pool) if CMS is suggesting they should price for 
the entire market. The cycle of insurers pricing on outdated information and individuals 
self-selecting into plans (based on old or no data) may result in insurers moving away 
from offering ACA plans.  This leaves fewer options for the consumer and more of a risk 
for the insurer if they take on more unhealthy individuals.  
 
Strengths of the Study  
 The strength of this study relies heavily on the access to data for the insurer being 
examined.  Additionally, confidence of this study can be attributed to the ability to 
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examine the price versus cost relationship and to graphically represent the outcome of 
adverse selection.  To date, there does not appear to be any other such research available 
utilizing actual ACA data in this manner. To validate the findings the bootstrap analysis 
was conducted and confirmed the results of the study which support the null hypothesis.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
There are limitations to the study conducted in this dissertation. The first 
limitation is that this study was done in the inaugural year of the ACA Risk Adjustment 
program. There were no known ways to accurately identify the health mix of those 
individuals, especially the previously uninsured, coming into the health insurance market. 
The study would be strengthened by observing the program over several years to 
determine if insurers have a better understanding of the health risk of the populations 
within the states they serve and if they are able to stabilize the premiums in those states.  
 The study could also be strengthened given the ability to incorporate more than 
one insurer into the research. The  ability to see what other insurers experienced in the 
way of selection patterns would help determine if adverse selection is a systemic problem 
or only problematic for certain insurers in certain states. While incorporating more than 
one insurer into the research would be beneficial, most insurers would be hesitant to 
share proprietary data that would allow a multiple issuer analysis to be completed.  
 Lastly, the study described in this dissertation only included paid claims as the as 
the incurred costs of the insurer. The study may have benefitted from including 
administrative costs associated with running the risk adjustment program.  
Adverse selection did exist prior to 2014 in the health insurance market and to 
ameliorate this phenomenon the current ACA risk adjustment model was implemented. 
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However, the initial year of the program did not, for the states reviewed in this paper, 
address the issue.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The sole purpose of this paper was to determine if risk adjustment protected one 
insurer from being adversely selected. However, there are numerous opportunities to 
extend this study. The research conducted in this dissertation could easily be extended to 
examine welfare loss and equilibrium as theorized and discussed extensively by Einav 
and Finkelstein. Another logical extension of the study would be the application of 
Glazer, McGuire and Shi’s methodology to examine equilibrium and efficient sorting.  
Efficient sorting places individuals the best plan based on their expected costs.  
 Future research should also include multiple years of risk adjustment data.  There 
are various unknowns that will occur from year to year even for one insurer.  The 
insurer’s population is likely to change especially as the insurer tries to correct or align 
pricing based on the previous year’s population. Also, it is unknown what other insurers 
will do in terms pricing and participation.   
The intricacies of the Risk adjustment program, the unknown risk pool, and the 
difficulties in pricing plans create a difficult environment for smaller insurers and new 
insurers wanting to participate in the individual marketplace.  
 
Conclusion 
 CMS indicated, in its Executive Summary in the 2016 White Paper on Risk 
Adjustment, that “The Affordable Care Act established a permanent risk adjustment 
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program to minimize the negative effects of adverse selection... (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2016).” In that same white paper CMS concluded that “the initial 
findings from benefit year 2014 indicate that, in general, the HHS risk adjustment 
methodology is working as intended (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2016).”  The findings in this dissertation provide empirical evidence that the program is 
not working as expected in all cases. Fortunately, large insurers can overcome adverse 
selection in some cases by covering their losses in one or more markets through other 
revenue streams. Smaller insurers do not necessarily enjoy that same advantage. Risk 
adjustment cannot work as intended if the consumer only has one or two options. There 
should be enough options to help spread the financial risk of insuring the less healthy 
enrollees. In addition the program cannot work as efficiently as possible if individuals are 
not enrolled in the correct plan that aligns with their risks. Public policy is needed to help 
drive individuals to the correct plans. If individuals are enrolled in the best plan choice 
based on their health risks, more insurers may be willing to participate in the 
marketplace. The concurrent model can be used successfully. To sustain this model, CMS 
should begin utilizing ACA RA data for calibration. If CMS is suggesting insurers set 
pricing based on the entire risk pool of the market then those enrollees in the market 
should be used in the calibration of the model. In addition, there should be consideration 
for the possibility of HCCs to follow enrollees who switch insurers in a calendar year. 
Finally, in lieu of a timely final payment notice, CMS should provide interim market 
reports that detail the state average risk scores and state average premiums to allow 
insurers to price plans accurately for the upcoming year.  
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 Adverse selection is not the problem in health care insurance; it is the product of 
information asymmetry and uninformed asymmetry. Risk adjustment may be the right 
solution but may need more time to mature. Only as the markets mature and insurers 
understand the market landscape will the MC start to flatten out. They need timely 
feedback from the government to price their plans accurately. HHS needs more data to 
calibrate the models accurately. Finally, individuals need more information to make 
informed decisions about their expected health care costs. Individuals, without some 
direction, can still make the wrong decision - either purposely or not. However, over time 
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Adverse Selection: a phenomenon where individuals who are less healthy and require 
health care services are the ones who purchase insurance 
Community Rating: Pricing of premiums based on geographic location, and age (rather 
than pricing each individual based on health status or health risk)    
Cost: (or Claims costs) - Amount insurer pays out for claims 
Cost Share Reduction (CSR): - Subsidy based on income that helps cover an 
individual’s out of pocket expenses  
Demand: represented by the amount of money an individual is willing to pay for a 
service or product – in healthcare the demand is represented by the Premium 
Enrollee: usually, this is any individual enrolled in a healthcare plan. For the purpose of 
this dissertation the Enrollee is the Subscriber. 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
Premium: Monthly amount paid by an individual (the Subscriber) to maintain health 
insurance 
Risk Pool: Population of insured individuals 
Subscriber: The individual who is responsible for payment of the premium 
Subsidy: Financial assistance from the government to help pay for a good or service 
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